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THE IMPACT OF PARTNER DIVERSITY 
WITHIN MULTIPARTY INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Despite the significant role that multiparty international joint ventures (MPIJVs) play within 
multinational enterprises, we know little about the significant challenges associated with the management 
of these ventures. Therefore, we combine the Resource-based View of the Firm and Transaction Cost 
Economics to investigate the effects of the key aspects of partner diversity (i.e., variety, balance, and 
disparity) on MPIJV dissolution. We test our hypotheses using a dataset of 248 MPIJVs in China. We 
find empirical support for a U-curve shaped effect of variety and a negative linear effect of balance on 
MPIJV dissolution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research shows that multiparty international joint ventures (MPIJVs), defined as equity 
partnerships of three or more firms, have become an increasingly important organizational form for 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). For example, 55 percent of the 737 international joint ventures (IJVs) 
established by Japanese firms in Makino and Beamish (1998)’s sample and 49 percent of Garcia-Canal, 
Valdes-Llaneza, and Arino’s (2003) sample of 80 IJVs established by Spanish firms involved three or 
more partners. Similarly, 30 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of Gong, Shenkar, Luo, and Nyaw 
(2007) and Griffith, Hu and Chen’s (1998) samples of IJVs in China had three or more partners. Although 
prior research into MPIJVs indicates that such alliances are less stable than dyadic alliances (e.g., 
Beamish & Kachra, 2004; Chung & Beamish, 2012), our understanding why this is the case is limited 
(Peng and Shenkar, 2002). In particular, existing research provides little guidance to firms with respect to 
the effects of partner combinations on the propensity of an MPIJV to dissolve. 
In contrast to firms involved in dyadic joint ventures, firms in MPIJVs have to deal with partners 
from multiple national backgrounds that can differ significantly from their own. Beyond the increase in 
coordination and governance costs, the involvement of three or more partners can also lead to the 
formation of sub-groups that increases the risk of discord and, hence, dissolution. For example, in our 
interview with a former general manager of an MPIJV between a German manufacturer of cleaning 
equipment and three local Chinese firms, this general manager reported that the Chinese partners “ganged 
up” on the German side to block important initiatives. According to this manager, the negative effect of a 
coalition within the MPIJV was an important reason for the German partner’s eventual decision to 
dissolve the MPIJV. Our intention, therefore, is to contribute to the nascent literature on MPIJVs by 
providing important new insights into the effects of diversity in partner firms’ national backgrounds on 
the dissolution of these ventures. 
The emerging research on MPIJVs is characterized by two contrasting views on whether the 
increasing number and diversity of partners is beneficial or detrimental to alliance success (Beamish, 
2010). One approach builds on the Resource-based View of the Firm (RBV) and highlights the positive 
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effects of heterogeneous resources assembled through an increasing number of diverse partners within 
international alliances (Beamish & Kachra, 2004; Goerzen, 2007; Goerzen & Beamish, 2005). In contrast, 
a second stream of research from a Transaction Cost Economics perspective (TCE) considers the 
transaction costs associated with coordinating multiple parties and expects alliance performance to 
decrease with a rising number of partners (Hennart & Zeng, 2005). Thus, RBV and TCE lead to 
contrasting conclusions of the effects of greater diversity within MPIJVs. 
To reconcile these differing perspectives, we introduce Stirling’s (2007) multifaceted concept of 
diversity comprising variety, disparity and balance to capture MPIJV diversity in terms of national 
backgrounds of MPIJV partners and then apply RBV and TCE perspectives to disentangle the survival 
effect of different facets of partner diversity. Specifically, we address the following research questions: 
(1) How does variety in partner firms’ national backgrounds affect the dissolution of MPIJVs? (2) How 
does the disparity of partner firms’ national backgrounds affect the dissolution of MPIJVs? (1) How does 
the balance among partner firms’ national backgrounds affect the dissolution of MPIJVs? 
2 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Our central argument is that diversity, reflected by the pattern of differences in national 
backgrounds of partner firms, is a unique characteristic of MPIJVs that affects the likelihood of MPIJV 
dissolution. Unlike the notions of “differences” and “distance” between national backgrounds of partner 
firms used in past research on dyadic IJVs, the concept of diversity provides information not only on the 
nature of differences in national backgrounds of partners in MPIJVs and but also on their pattern. 
Scholars have highlighted the multifaceted nature of diversity and stressed the distribution of 
members into categories and the degree to which these categories differ (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005; 
Harrison & Klein, 2007; Stirling, 1999, 2007). According to Stirling (1999: 38), diversity “relates to the 
nature or degree of apportionment of a quantity to a set of well-defined categories”. We suggest that, in 
the context of MPIJVs, the apportionment of partner firms in terms of their national backgrounds is of 
particular importance because the routines and repertoires of MPIJV partners have been imprinted by the 
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environments in their home countries (see, for example, Gong, et al., 2007; Kogut, 2005; Luo, Shenkar, & 
Nyaw, 2001). 
Prior research has explained how firms develop particular characteristics in response to 
isomorphic pressures resulting from cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative facets of their context 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Due to the home-country imprinting of MNEs and the diffusion of this 
imprint to their overseas operations (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), the routines and repertoires of firms that 
collaborate within MPIJVs vary. This variation in routines and repertoires leads both to benefits as well as 
costs and, thus, partners’ differing incentives to terminate the venture. In the following section, therefore, 
we examine the concept of diversity to consider how this aspect of alliances affects the dissolution of 
MPIJVs. 
2.1 The Concept of Diversity 
Researchers in different fields, including economics (e.g., Stirling, 1999, 2007) scientometrics 
(e.g., Rafols & Meyer, 2010), and organizational behavior (Harrison & Klein, 2007) agree on the 
multifaceted nature of diversity. Although there are slight variations in the terminology used for different 
facets of diversity, Stirling’s (1999, 2007) review of research using the concept of diversity shows that, 
across a wide range of sciences, diversity usually includes the following three key facets: variety, balance 
and disparity. According to Stirling (2007: 709), “despite the multiple disciplines and divergent context 
there seems no other obvious candidate for a fourth important general property of diversity beyond these 
three.” At the same time, Stirling (2007) suggests that all three facets are necessary, but individually 
insufficient, for analyzing the diversity of a given system. Given its ability to capture the key facets of 
diversity, Stirling’s (2007) concept of diversity has, for instance, been used to analyze the role of diversity 
for alliance networks (e.g., Phelps, 2010) and the success of recombinant innovation (e.g., van den Bergh, 
2008). Stirling’s (2007) concept of diversity, however, has so far not been applied to the context of 
MPIJVs despite the fact that it could provide significant new insights.  
Variety, as the first facet of diversity of Stirling’s (2007: 709) concept, refers to “the number of 
categories into which system elements are apportioned. It is the answer to the question: ‘how many types 
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of thing do we have?’”. Variety has been used in the economics literature to capture the number of 
distinguishable actors, products, or technologies in an economy (Saviotti, 1996).  Research on multi-party 
constellations such as alliance networks have accounted for variety among firms, frequently using the 
label heterogeneity. For example, one of Goerzen and Beamish’s (2005) measures of alliance network 
diversity is the number of different industries from which a firms’ alliance partners originate. Similarly, in 
their analysis of innovation Cui and O’Connor (2012) account for the number of nations represented in 
firms’ alliance portfolio. In this study, we use this concept to theorize about the survival effects of an 
increasing number of different national backgrounds among partner firms within MPJVs. 
Stirling’s (2007: 709) second facet of diversity, balance, reflects the “pattern of apportionment of 
elements across categories. It is the answer to the question: ‘how much of each type of thing do we 
have?’” In the economics literature the concept of balance is discussed, for example, in terms of the 
concentration of industries (e.g., Scherer, 1980). Balance plays a central role in studies of diversity in 
other settings including, in particular, the context of work groups (e.g., Earley & Mosakowski, 2000). We 
use the term balance to reflect the degree to which members of a unit distribute evenly across different 
categories. Given our focus on partner firms’ national background as a particularly salient attribute of 
partner firms in MPIJVs, balance relates to the degree to which partner firms in IMPJV distribute evenly 
across different national backgrounds. 
The third facet of diversity in Stirling’s (2007: 709) concept, disparity, refers “to the manner and 
degree in which the elements [of a system] may be distinguished [..]. It is the answer to the question: 
‘how different from each other are the types of thing that we have?’” Disparity relates to the differences 
among elements of a system. The notion of disparity has been used in evolutionary economics to capture 
differences in the resource base of firms in an industry (e.g., Woerter, 2009) or to reflect differences 
among firms in alliance networks (e.g., Phelps, 2010; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). For example, Phelps 
(2010) investigated the technological differences among the firms belonging to a network, while Rodan 
and Galunic (2004) analyzed differences among firms’ knowledge. Since we consider diversity with 
regard to partner firms’ national backgrounds as one of the most salient characteristic of MPIJVs, we look 
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at the differences that exist between the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive environments in 
partner firms’ home countries.  
2.2 The Impact of Variety on MPIJV Dissolution 
Although prior research has not investigated the effects of three key facets of diversity 
simultaneously, the role of differences between (two) partners has traditionally played a central role in 
explanations of the dissolution of (dyadic) IJVs (e.g., Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; Park & Ungson, 
1997; Steensma & Lyles, 2000; Xia, 2011). One stream of research on the role of inter-firm differences in 
IJVs has suggested that partner firms’ resources and capabilities need to be complementary and 
synergistic in order for the IJV to be competitive, perform well, meet partner firms’ objectives, and 
reduce the chances that partners decide to terminate the joint venture (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Park & 
Ungson, 1997). This research frequently uses the RBV perspective to explain how these differences 
between partners can allow IJVs to create sustainable and difficult-to-imitate competitive advantages 
(e.g., Beamish & Kachra, 2004; Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001). 
While RBV-based research has highlighted the benefits of synergistic differences between 
partners, other work has stressed the potentially negative effects of differences, in particular cultural 
differences between partners, on joint venture longevity (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Park & 
Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991). Much of this stream of research uses TCE logic and argues that differences 
between partners increase the costs of coordinating, monitoring, and acculturating partners and thus 
reduce an IJV’s net value. These inter-partner differences are also understood to destabilize the IJV by 
preventing the development of trust, causing frequent and potentially irreconcilable conflicts among 
partners, or by making opportunistic behavior more likely (Madhok, 1995; Park & Ungson, 1997). Since 
both the RBV and TCE have played a significant role in investigating the consequences of differences 
between partners in dyadic IJVs, we suggest that these approaches can be extended to the analysis of the 
consequences of diversity in MPIJVs. RBV stresses the importance of resources and capabilities that are 
valuable, rare, and inimitable (Barney, 1991). In line with this thinking, previous research suggests that a 
greater number of IJV partners allow the venture access to a larger pool of resources (Gong, et al., 2007) 
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increasing the net value of the venture to partners thereby making them less likely to terminate the 
venture. While Gong et al. (2007) highlight the positive effect of pooling partners’ resources, their 
argument pertains to the mere accumulation of partners’ resources. In contrast, Beamish and Kachra 
(2004) stress the positive effects of an increase in the number of partners on the heterogeneity of 
resources because of the growing variance in national backgrounds of partners involved in the MPIJV 
(Beamish & Kachra, 2004; Chung & Beamish, 2012). The increased resource heterogeneity would allow 
an MPIJV to achieve greater returns by raising its potential for synergies (Chung & Beamish, 2012; Luo, 
1997) and by fostering innovation (Beamish & Kachra, 2004). In turn, the greater returns of 
heterogeneous MPIJVs reduce partners’ incentives to terminate the venture. The positive effect of 
resource heterogeneity has also been supported by Garcia-Canal and Sanchez-Lorda (2007) who found 
that markets react positively to an increase in alliance partners among European telecommunication firms 
if they have different national backgrounds and negatively if they do not. 
Research on groups suggests that variety among group members enhances the information, 
knowledge, and experience available within the group (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Jehn, 1995). Similarly, 
research on alliance portfolios suggests that firms with diverse alliance partners have better access to non-
redundant information and resources (e.g., Bruyaka & Durand, 2012; Goerzen, 2007). This access to 
diverse and non-redundant resources in turn increases firms’ competitiveness, performance and, thus, 
reduces the likelihood of dissolution (Silverman & Baum, 2002). 
At low levels of variety, an MPIJV’s resource pool is likely to be limited reducing the 
opportunities to achieve synergies. All else equal, an IJV that does not allow partner firms to access to 
resources that complement their own creates only limited value to partners and is, therefore, more likely 
to be terminated. As has been argued for alliance portfolios (Koka & Prescott, 2002), we also expect 
MPIJVs with a greater level of variety in partners’ national backgrounds to have access to a larger and 
more diverse network of external ties. Large and diverse external networks improve the organization’s 
ability to manage external dependence, create new business opportunities, and may insulate an 
organization from negative interferences (Koka & Prescott, 2002). While these effects have been 
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analyzed through network theory, firms’ connectedness to others has also been conceptualized as an 
important resource within an extended RBV framework (Lavie, 2002; Wassmer, 2010). Thus, as these 
effects increase the net value of an MPIJV to the partners, their incentives to terminate an MPIJV decline 
with increasing external network diversity. MPIJVs with high levels of variety will have access to a larger 
and more diverse set of external ties than MPIJVs with low levels of variety and, thus, will be less likely 
to dissolve. Based on these positive effects associated with variety from the RBV perspective, we expect a 
negative association between variety and the likelihood of MPIJV dissolution. 
From a TCE perspective, we expect variety to have a positive effect on IJV dissolution by 
increasing transaction costs that, at high levels of variety, will offset the benefits of variety thereby 
reducing the net value of an IJV to the partners, increasing their incentives to terminate the venture. 
Research employing TCE logic has stressed that an increase in the number of partner firms in IJVs would 
raise the transaction costs by rendering monitoring and information sharing more difficult (Hennart & 
Zeng, 2005; Zeng & Chen, 2003). Therefore, the increasing difficulty of monitoring partner firms’ 
behaviors with a growing number of partner firms make free-riding and opportunistic behaviors more 
likely (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993a) as well as making them more difficult to detect (Hennart & 
Zeng, 2005; Zeng & Chen, 2003). The difficulties and costs associated with monitoring partner firms are 
greater when partner firms originate in different countries, i.e., at higher levels of variety (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1997). We suggest that a modest increase in variety does not lead to disproportionate cost 
increase due to the existence of slack resources. Rather, we suggest that the costs associated with 
increasing variety grow slowly at first, but then grow exponentially at increasingly high levels of variety 
when existing resources increasingly become stretched with the increasing coordination and integration 
requirements associated with increasing variety among partners. 
Combining our arguments derived from the RBV and TCE perspectives on the role of variety in 
MPIJVs, we suggest that there will be a U-curve relationship between variety, i.e., the number of different 
national backgrounds represented by MPIJV partners and alliance dissolution. Increases in variety will 
allow firms to reap the benefits of variety in line with RBV logic. Given the proposed negligible increase 
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in costs associated with increasing variety outlined above, we expect the chances of dissolution to decline 
up to moderate levels of variety. As variety rises, however, the costs of increasing variety start to grow 
exponentially, reducing the benefits and leading to growing risks of MPIJV dissolution at high levels of 
variety as per our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a U-curve relationship between variety and MPIJV  
dissolution. 
 
2.3 The Impact of Balance on MPIJV Dissolution 
Balance, our second facet of diversity, refers to the degree to which the partner firms in an 
MPIJV distribute evenly across national backgrounds. We suggest that, based on both RBV and TCE 
logic, balance negatively affects the dissolution of MPIJVs by avoiding the conflicts and difficulties 
associated with the emergence of sub-groups which increases partners’ incentives to terminate the 
venture. While the formation of sub-groups has been a central issue in research on groups (see, for 
example, Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001; Li & Hambrick, 2005), this aspect of diversity has remained 
largely unexplored in research on MPIJVs. Exceptions to this are Gong et al. (2007) and Garcia-Canal et 
al. (2003) who mention the negative effects of the potential formation of sub-groups among partners in 
their investigation of the effects of an increasing number of partners in IJVs. While previous authors do 
not discuss the potential bases on which sub-groups are formed, recent research on alliances has 
highlighted the role of prior relationships between some of the firms in a multiparty alliance for the 
formation of sub-groups (Heidl, Steensma, & Phelps, 2014). 
Previous research on work teams suggested that sub-group formation is more likely in cases 
where some of the group members share certain characteristics (e.g., Li & Hambrick, 2005). In groups in 
which all group members are different, sub-group formation is less likely as few or no common bases 
exist (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Earley and Mosakowski (2000), for example, suggest that the formation 
of sub-groups is unlikely within groups where all members have the same nationality or in which all 
members have different nationalities; in contrast, if several members share a national background, they 
would have a strong tendency to form sub-groups based on their relative similarity to each other. Thus, 
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we suggest that the likelihood of sub-group formation is greater in MPIJVs with unbalanced proportions 
of partners’ national backgrounds. 
From an RBV perspective, we expect that sub-group formation will restrict the full exploitation 
and integration of partner firms’ resources in unbalanced MPIJVs making partners more likely to 
terminate such MPIJVs. In contrast, sub-group formation and its effects are less likely to occur in 
balanced MPIJVs making partners comparatively less likely to terminate these partnerships. Research has 
found that lower levels of interaction, information exchange, and perceived equality are associated with 
sub-group formation as their members tend to favor information from within the subgroup over 
information from without (e.g., Harrison & Klein, 2007; Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De 
Dreu, 2007; Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). 
The existence of sub-groups thus increases the risk that flows of information and resources 
among sub-group members will displace flows between firms within and outside the sub-group, 
increasing outsider firms’ incentives to terminate an MPIJV. Firms outside the sub-group may become 
reluctant to share information and resources, while firms within the sub-group may perceive little need to 
share information/resources with outsiders. Additionally, since the integration of partners’ diverse 
resources and capabilities in an effort to create complex and difficult-to-imitate advantages is a key aspect 
of MPIJVs from the RBV perspective, any limitations to the integration of partners’ resources due to the 
formation of sub-groups would reduce the development of such advantages. RBV logic would thus 
suggest that, given the lower likelihood of sub-group formation, balanced MPIJVs are less likely to 
dissolve than unbalanced MPIJVs. 
Similarly, from a TCE perspective, we expect that a balanced MPIJV is less likely than an 
unbalanced one to dissolve owing to the latter’s reduced coordination costs, conflicts, and opportunistic 
behavior given their comparatively lesser scope for sub-group formation. Prior research has shown that 
high levels of in-group favoritism, out-group stereotyping, and conflicts in groups are common 
consequences of sub-group formation (e.g., Homan, et al., 2007; Jehn, et al., 1999). Sub-group formation 
thus implies increased coordination costs and governance costs owing to a greater risk of opportunistic 
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behavior of partner firms. Both types of costs reduce the net value of the IJV to the partners and thus 
increase the risk of MPIJV dissolution.  
Further, sub-groups of partners in unbalanced MPIJVs are more likely to strive for outcomes that 
are beneficial to the sub-group members but not necessarily advantageous for the remaining partner firms 
or for the MPIJV as a whole (Shenkar & Yan, 2002). This organizational dysfunction may lead to an 
effort to impose particular policies, practices, or procedures onto the management of the MPIJV. Such 
attempts to dominate an MPIJV are likely to be underpinned by the greater bargaining power resulting 
from the pooling of sub-group members’ resources and voting rights (Makino & Beamish, 1998; Yan & 
Gray, 1994). While this effort to dominate the MPIJVs is likely to increase the occurrence of conflicts and 
the associated costs of coordination, the combined and thus greater power-base of the sub-group members 
may also lead the sub-group to expect to “get away with” certain behaviors, thus increasing opportunistic 
behavior and the dissolution risk in unbalanced MPIJVs. 
Finally, sub-group formation may lead to actual or perceived inequality of those members that are 
not part of the sub-group, resulting in their withdrawal, resentful deviance, opportunistic behavior, and 
more frequent conflict with sub-group members (Gong, et al., 2007; Lau & Murninghan, 1998). 
Coordination and governance costs as well as the frequency of conflicts thus increase further owing to 
potential reactions of firms outside a particular sub-group to the formation of the sub-group, resulting in 
greater dissolution risk. Overall, we thus suggest that from both the RBV and TCE perspective, balance 
will negatively affect MPIJV dissolution as per our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the level of balance and the 
likelihood of MPIJV dissolution. 
 
2.4 The Impact of Disparity on MPIJV Dissolution 
Whereas the first facet of diversity (i.e., variety) referred to the mere existence of differences 
among the members of a unit, our third facet of diversity—disparity—refers to the relative amount by 
which partner firms’ national backgrounds differ from each other. For example, while an MPIJV with 
partners from the US, Canada, and the UK would have the same level of variety as an MPIJV with 
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partners from the US, China, and Egypt, the latter has a much greater disparity between partners’ national 
backgrounds. As above, we explore the effects of these differences from both RBV and TCE perspectives. 
Adopting the RBV logic, we suggest that increasing differences in partners’ national backgrounds 
negatively affects MPIJV dissolution as these differences reduce the likelihood that partner firms’ 
resources and capabilities are redundant (Goerzen, 2007). Non-redundant resources and capabilities are 
more likely to lead to the creation of valuable, rare, and non-inimitable advantages than are overlapping 
or redundant resources and capabilities which increases a IJV’s competitiveness and value to partners 
making them less likely to terminate the a IJV. In their study of the survival of overseas subsidiaries, Gaur 
and Lu (2007: 88) argue that the differences between the resources and capabilities of foreign investors 
and those available in a host country increase with the differences between a foreign investor’s home 
country and the host country, allowing for “institutional arbitrage”. 
Similarly, Beamish and Kachra (2004) argue that cultural differences between partners is 
positively related to resource heterogeneity, empirically showing that there is no relationship between the 
number of partners and performance in IJVs when all partners come from the same home country. These 
authors argued that, because there are no cultural differences in these cases, resources would be more 
similar and, thus, IJVs would not benefit from the resource heterogeneity necessary for sustainable 
competitive advantage that would make partners reluctant to terminate an IJV. The positive effects of 
differences in the national backgrounds of partners and the associated resource heterogeneity on IJV 
survival may also explain the findings of Park and Russo (1996) and Park and Ungson (1997) who 
expected a positive effect of cultural differences on IJV dissolution in their study but, instead, found a 
negative one. 
Finally, increasing differences between partners also raise the scope for the creation of relational 
rents that depend on the “idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners” (Dyer & Singh, 
1998: 662) that cannot be (re-)created by partner firms outside the focal alliance (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Madhok & Tallman, 1998). The existence of such relational rents thus reduces the substitutability of 
partners in an MPIJV, decreasing firms’ incentives to terminate the IJV (Xia, 2011). Following the RBV 
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logic, we thus suggest that the disparity between partner firms’ national background negatively affects the 
dissolution of MPIJVs. 
From a TCE perspective, however, in contrast to the RBV lens, increasing differences among 
partners’ national backgrounds increase the propensity of dissolution. This is because the choices and 
attendant costs of safeguards employed in a transaction depend not only on the characteristics of the 
transaction but also on the identity of the party one is dealing with (Dyer, 1997). More specifically, Dyer 
(1997) argues that safeguarding costs, e.g., those associated with monitoring contracts, are negatively 
related to the knowledge of, and trust in, the transacting party. Similarly, Parkhe (1993b) suggests that 
knowledge about partner firms’ past behaviors and their reputation affects the perceived probability that 
they act opportunistically. The greater the differences between partners, the less partners know about each 
other and the more difficult it is to assess partner firms’ past behaviors and reputation resulting in lower 
mutual trust. We suggest, therefore, that disparity among partners reduces firms’ inclinations to lower 
their safeguards against opportunistic behavior, keeping partner firms’ perceived risks and costs high. 
Taken together, the net effect is that the value to partners of the IJV is reduced, increasing their incentives 
to terminate it. 
Cultural differences, in particular, have been highlighted as an important source of uncertainty, 
miscommunication, and conflicts in IJVs (Makino, Chan, Isobe, & Beamish, 2007). Increasing 
differences among partners thus raise and keep at a high level the uncertainty that exists with regard to the 
partner firms’ inclination to behave opportunistically. Therefore, the transaction costs associated with an 
increase in uncertainty associated with the cultural differences between partners, diminishes the value of 
the venture to the partners, increasing the risk of MPIJV dissolution. 
To reduce the occurrence of opportunistic behavior, research has stressed the importance of 
developing a macroculture, i.e., a set of shared assumptions, values, and beliefs (Jones, Hesterly, & 
Borgatti, 1997). However, as growing differences in partner firms’ national backgrounds are associated 
with increasing differences in partners’ assumptions, values, and beliefs, the development of such a 
macroculture is more difficult with rising levels of differences and reduced trust among partner firms 
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from different national backgrounds (Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, & Tan, 2000; Gulati & Sytch, 2008; 
Park & Ungson, 2001). Since prior research regards trust as an important aspect of IJV survival, its 
absence keeps the IJV at a comparatively greater risk of dissolution. Even if it were possible, however, 
the development of trust requires close monitoring and interpretation of partners’ behaviors over time, a 
process that is not without costs (Dyer, 1997; Parkhe, 1993b), which would rise with the level of 
differences (and thus growing behavioral opacity) between partner firms. 
Finally, disparity between partner firms will also raise the coordination costs and the risk of 
conflicts among partners, making partner firms more likely to terminate a MPIJV. Das and Teng (2002) 
suggest that the absence of common beliefs among alliance partners not only increases the need for 
coordination, but also makes coordination more difficult and costly. Disparity among group members also 
raises the risk of conflict (see, for example, Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999) which, in turn, has been 
found to be negatively related to decision-making and group outcomes such as member satisfaction and 
group cohesion (e.g. Jehn, 1995). Disparity among group members increases the risk of conflicts and 
coordination costs owing to partners’ diverging experiences, approaches to problem solving and cultural 
backgrounds (e.g., Garcia-Canal, et al., 2003). Based on TCE logic, we thus expect disparity among 
partners to have a positive effect on MPIJV dissolution because of the associated increase in coordination 
and transaction costs and the associated reduction in the IJV’s net value to partners making them more 
likely to terminate an IJV. 
As was the case with the cost effects of increasing variety, however, we do not expect modest 
increases in disparity to lead to a significant raise in costs. Small differences among partners do not 
require major adjustments of partner firms’ routines and practices; however, new, shared scripts and 
monitoring mechanisms become necessary when there is a high level of disparity among partner firms 
(Goerzen & Beamish, 2005). Moreover, as suggested by Prahalad and Bettis (1986) a firm’s ‘dominant 
logic’ is useful in managing low to moderate diversity in its alliances, but this logic might become a 
liability with increasing diversity. We thus suggest that the costs associated with increasing disparity 
grow slowly at first, but then grow exponentially at higher levels of variety. 
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Combining our arguments derived from RBV and TCE on the effects of the disparity among 
partner firms on the dissolution of a MPIJV, we suggest that there will be a U-curve shaped relationship 
between disparity and MPIJV dissolution. Increases in disparity will reduce the likelihood that partner 
firms’ resources are redundant making IJV dissolution less likely in line with the conventional RBV 
logic. Given an insignificant increase in costs associated with low to moderate levels of disparity as 
outlined above, dissolution risk is thus likely to decline up to moderate levels of disparity. At higher 
levels of disparity, however, the costs will rise exponentially and will attenuate the benefits of increasing 
disparity as summarized in our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a U-curve association between the disparity among partner firms’ 
national backgrounds and the likelihood of MPIJV dissolution. 
3 METHODS 
3.1 Research Context 
Our sample consists of MPIJVs located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is an 
appropriate research setting for investigating our hypotheses for a number of reasons. First, the 
complexity of the environment in the PRC often means that firms co-opt multiple firms that have specific 
resources, information, or ties that reduce the risks associated with dealing with different facets of this 
complex and dynamic environment. IJVs thus continue to be a prevalent mode of entry and MPIJVs are 
important for foreign investors in the PRC. In addition, recent anecdotal evidence indicates a pause (if not 
a reversal) of many liberalization policies in the PRC, potentially leading to an even greater emphasis on 
IJVs as entry modes for foreign firms. Further, there are significant differences in the national 
backgrounds of partners participating in MPIJVs in the PRC, given its high level of attractiveness for 
foreign investors from the developed economies creating an ideal research setting given our research 
questions. Thus, we expected our sample to contain cases of high diversity leading to a less restricted 
range of diversity, which Harrison and Klein (2007) suggest is necessary to study diversity. 
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3.2 Sample and Data 
We created our data set by extracting all IJVs in the PRC established between 1985 and 2009 
from SDC Platinum. The cut-off year was set at two years prior to the start of our analysis to avoid 
survivor bias, resulting in 6,641 IJVs. Since SDC platinum does not provide information about the 
termination of IJVs, we had to confirm the survival or termination of each IJV using online information 
such as news services and company websites. We decided, therefore, to randomly select 1,500 of which 
57 had pre-determined expiry dates and were thus excluded given that the termination of such IJVs is less 
likely to be considered as a failure (e.g., Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Makino, et al., 2007; Polidoro, Ahuja, 
& Mitchell, 2011; Yan & Zeng, 1999). From among the remaining 1,443 IJVs, we were able to confirm 
termination or continued existence for 693 IJVs. Out of these 693 IJVs, 248 IJVs had more than two 
partner firms and, thus, were classified as MPIJVs. These 248 MPIJVs were established by 840 parent 
firms with an average number of 3.4 partners per firm. A total of 188 MPIJVs operated in the 
manufacturing sector, 45 in the services sector, and 17 in the primary sector. A total of 36 of the 248 
MPIJVs had been terminated and nine of the MPIJVs were converted into dyadic IJVs and were treated as 
censored cases. The remaining 203 MPIJVs continued to operate. The average termination age of 
terminated MPIJVs in our database was 7.3 years. 
3.3 Measures 
In line with past empirical analyses of the dissolution of IJVs (e.g., Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; 
Xia, 2011), we use a Cox proportional hazard model to test our hypotheses. Accordingly, our dependent 
variable is the hazard rate of an IJV, which reflects the intensity with which terminations occur. This 
variable comprises two parts: a dichotomous variable reflecting the status of each MPIJV (i.e., 0 = 
surviving, 1 = terminated) and the age of the MPIJV from the announcement of its establishment either to 
the termination date or, for surviving MPIJVs, up to our cut-off date. 
We measured our independent variables as follows. We measured variety of national 
backgrounds within MPIJVs, by counting the number of different national backgrounds among MPIJV 
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partners. To measure balance in the distribution of different national backgrounds among MPIJV 
partners, i.e., our second independent variable, we calculated Blau’s index as per the equation below: 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢′𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥: 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑘
2 
where Blau’s index can range from zero to (K-1)/K, with K being the number of categories (national 
backgrounds) and 𝑝𝑘  as the share of the k
th
 category in a system (i.e., and MPIJV in our study). At its 
maximum, the categories of interest (k) – in our case national backgrounds—are spread evenly. In this 
basic form, Blau’s indices are not directly comparable when the number of categories is not the same 
across systems, as the theoretical maximum number of categories varies with the number of elements 
(partner firms) across systems (i.e., MPIJVs). For example, the maximum value for the index for a MPIJV 
with three partners, i.e., where the three partners all have three different national backgrounds, would be 
0.67. In contrast, for a MPIJV with nine partners from nine different national backgrounds the maximum 
for Blau’s index would be 0.89. To allow for comparability, researchers have suggested to standardize 
Blau’s index by dividing the index by its theoretical maximum (Harrison & Klein, 2007) and so we 
followed this approach.  
To measure the level of disparity, i.e., the degree of differences in the national backgrounds 
among partners in MPIJVs, we adopted Scott’s (1995) concept of institutions and calculated regulative, 
normative, and cognitive-cultural differences among MPIJV partners’ national backgrounds. Unlike 
previous authors who focused on differences between two countries (e.g., He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 
2013), we summed up the difference scores for each of the n (n-1)/2 dyadic relationships in each 
individual MPIJV (n being the number of partners). Following He et al. (2013), we measure the 
regulatory differences among partner firms’ backgrounds using the Economic Freedom Index published 
by the Heritage Foundation which consists of ten items reflecting the degree to which an environments 
supports or hinders economic activity in a country. To measure normative differences we also followed 
the approach taken by He et al. (2013) by taking the following items from the Global Competitiveness 
Report (Sala-i-Martin & Artadi, 2004): efficacy of corporate boards, pay and productivity, capacity and 
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innovation, degree of customer orientation, extent of staff training, reliance on professional management, 
and willingness to delegate authority. To measure cognitive-cultural differences among partner firms’ 
national backgrounds, we follow He et al. (2013) by using data on national cultures from Hofstede 
(2001). 
To control for environmental uncertainty, which has been argued to affect firms’ preference for 
IJVs (see, for example, Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003), we included 
the NERI marketization-index (Fan & Wang, 2001) of the Chinese province in which the IJV is located. 
We also controlled for foreign partners’ host country experience based on research that has highlighted 
the role of such experience for IJVs (e.g., Delios & Beamish, 1999; Pangarkar, 2003) through an index 
that reflects the sum of the number of all IJV operations of the respective foreign partner(s) in our entire 
database up to the dissolution of the MPIJV or our cut-off date. Accounting for research that highlights 
the importance of equity distribution for the dissolution of IJVs (Beamish, 1985; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 
2004), we also include the distribution of equity in the IJVs using a dummy variable taking on values of 1 
for IJVs in which equity shares were distributed equally and 0 for unequal equity distributions. Given the 
role that state-owned actors play in the PRC as partners for foreign investors (e.g., Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 
2010), we controlled for government participation by using a dummy that takes on the value of “0” for no 
government/SOE, and “1” for government/SOE participation in the MPIJV. Further, as government 
policy towards foreign investors changed as a result of the PRC’s entry into the WTO in 2001 (Lu & Ma, 
2008), we included a dummy variable (Post 2001) taking on the value of “0” if a IJV was set up before or 
in 2001 and “1” for IJVs established after 2001. We also controlled for partner firms that operate in the 
same industry, as IJVs between competitors have been shown to be less likely to survive (Park & Russo, 
1996). Finally, we control for the industry of the IJV based on studies that have argued for varying IJV 
survival rates across industries due to differences such as growth rates and concentration (Kogut, 1989). 
Table 1 reports our descriptive statistics. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
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4 RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of our variables. Our three key facets of diversity are not 
correlated with each other and, thus, provide orthogonal perspectives on the diversity phenomenon in 
MPIJVs. 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
Similar to other survival studies, we employ Cox's proportional hazards model using STATA 11 
to test our hypotheses. This approach treats one subject’s hazard as a multiplicative replica of the other 
subjects’ hazard and therefore permits a flexible hazard function after conditioning on explanatory factors 
other than age. A key assumption of this approach is that the covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline 
hazard function. We checked this assumption using Schoenfeld’s global test and found a violation of this 
assumption. We thus used a stratified model allowing baseline hazards to be different for each industry. 
Schoenfeld’s global test for this stratified model indicates no violation of the proportional hazards 
assumption
1
. 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
Model 1 in Table 3 is the standard Cox's proportional hazards model and Model 2 is the stratified 
model. The results for both models are similar but we base our discussion on Model 2, as the proportional 
hazards assumption was violated in Model 1. The Wald chi-square statistic of 28.36 indicates the model is 
statistically significant and the Harrell’s C of 0.7251 indicates the predictive accuracy of the model is 
acceptable. 
In our first hypothesis, we expected a U-curve shaped influence of variety on the dissolution 
chances of MPIJVs. In line with this hypothesis, the findings in Model 2 in Table 3 show a negative effect 
(p < 0.10) of variety and positive effect of variety squared (p < 0.01) on dissolution, supporting the U-
curve shaped association between variety and survival we proposed in Hypothesis 1. 
In our second hypothesis, we proposed a negative effect of balance between the national 
backgrounds represented by partners in MPIJVs on MPIJV dissolution. As the results for Model 2 in 
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Table 3 show, this second hypothesis also is supported by our findings. The results confirm that balance 
has a negative influence on the dissolution of MPIJVs (p < 0.01). 
Our third hypothesis suggested a U-curve shaped effect of the level of differences in partner 
firms’ national backgrounds on the dissolution of MPIJVs. We find no empirical support for any effects 
on MPIJV dissolution of the normative or cognitive-cultural differences and the respective coefficients 
are not statistically significant. With regard to the effect of the regulative differences among partner firms, 
our results indicate—in contrast to our hypothesis—the existence an inverted U-curve shaped relationship 
between regulative differences and survival. From among the control variables included in Model 2 
uncertainty, foreign firms’ host country experience, the distribution of equity between partner firms and 
intra-IJV are statistically significant. While the industry effect cannot be retrieved for the stratified Cox 
Proportional Hazard model since this model allows the baseline hazards differ by group, the industry 
effect can be captured by industry dummies in the standard Cox Proportional Hazard model albeit less 
precisely. 
To test the robustness of our results, we performed additional estimations using two parametric 
proportional hazard methods, an exponential model (Model 3 in Table 3), and a Weibull model (Model 4 
in Table 3). These two models are less flexible as they fix the baseline hazard but are more efficient than 
the Cox Proportional Hazard model. The results from those two models are very similar to the Model 2 
results. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Our study of the survival of MPIJVs in the PRC was motivated by the growing importance of 
MPIJVs across both developed and emerging economies combined with suggestions in research that such 
MPIJVs are less stable than dyadic IJVs. We investigated the role of partner diversity as a central 
construct used in arguments for both the negative as well as the positive effects of an increasing number 
of partners in IJVs. By treating RBV and TCE as complementary, rather than competing, explanations of 
the effects of partner diversity on the dissolution MPIJVs, we aimed to reconcile the conflicting views in 
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the literature with regard to the effect of diversity on MPIJV dissolution. We conceptualize diversity in 
MPIJVs as a multi-faceted concept comprising variety, balance, and disparity among partner firms. Based 
on this concept, we combine the RBV and TCE perspectives to derive hypotheses that account for both 
the positive and the negative effects of increasing partner diversity on the survival of MPIJVs in the PRC. 
We argued for a U-curve shaped effect of variety in partner firms’ national backgrounds on 
MPIJV dissolution and this effect was supported by our empirical results. We argued that the negative 
effect on dissolution of increasing variety highlighted from a RBV-perspective would be attenuated and 
eventually outweighed by increasing costs associated with coordinating and integrating increasingly 
heterogeneous routines and repertoires; this, in turn, would reduce the venture’s value to partners, making 
them more likely to terminate it (Goerzen, 2007). The applicability of RBV or TCE logic thus depends on 
the level of variety existing in a MPIJV, highlighting the boundaries of each of these perspectives in the 
particular context of MPIJVs. 
We expected the balance among partner firms’ national backgrounds to have a negative effect on 
MPIJV dissolution; this hypothesis was supported. We suggest that this negative effect of balance on 
MPIJV dissolution results from the reduced likelihood of sub-group formation which we assumed to 
make dissolution more likely on the basis of research into the effects of sub-group formation in multiparty 
alliances and groups (e.g., Heidl, et al., 2014; Homan, et al., 2007). Our findings support the argument 
that imbalance in terms of national background in MPIJVs increases the chances of sub-group formation, 
which in turn raises the risk of dissolution. Heidl et al. (2014) stress that sub-groups may form in 
multiparty alliances because of the prior relationships between some of the firms involved in such 
alliances. Since there were no cases of firms in our sample that were also collaborating outside the 
respective MPIJV, we were not able to investigate if prior relationships moderate the effect of balance on 
MPIJV dissolution. A further robustness test that we explored was that sub-group formation might be a 
result of some of the partner firms sharing the same language
2
. We thus calculated our measure of balance 
based on shared language rather than shared nationality. The results of this additional analysis show that 
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balance among partners in terms of language does not have a statistically significant effect on MPIJV 
dissolution. 
In addition, while Garcia-Canal et al. (2003) argue that compared to dyadic JVs, MPIJVs are 
likely to rely to a lower extent on trust and would thus benefit more from dominant control, our findings 
indicate that dominant control exerted by sub-groups formed based on shared national backgrounds 
increases the risk of dissolution. At the same time, however, the findings for our control variable that 
reflected unequal equity shares confirms Garcia-Canal et al.’s (2003) arguments. Our findings, thus, 
provide further detail on the likely contingencies of the effects of dominant control in MPIJVs. 
In our third hypothesis, we proposed a U-curve relationship between the disparity among partner 
firms’ background and the risk that MPIJVs in the PRC dissolve; yet, our findings do not support this 
hypothesis. The coefficients for normative and cognitive-cultural differences are not statistically 
significant. Cognitive-cultural and normative differences among partner firms’ home countries may only 
be blunt proxies for the idiosyncratic and complementary resources that the partner firms are able to bring 
into a MPIJV. Similar, although the prior research into the survival of dyadic IJVs suggests negative 
effects of cultural distance (see, for example, Hennart & Zeng, 2002), cultural differences among partners 
may not have the same effect on the survival on IJVs and on MPIJVs. Firms’ decisions to enter an MPIJV 
may indicate a greater willingness to adjust to other partners’ cognitive-cultural characteristics and 
practices and, thus, are likely to attenuate any potential negative effects of cultural differences. In their 
study of the performance of MPIJVs, Gong et al. (2007) even found a (weakly significant) positive effect 
of cultural distance on the performance of multi-party IJVs. 
Our findings thus suggest that recent calls for  a more balanced view of the role of culture and an 
exploration of the potential benefits of cultural distance (see, for example, Stahl & Tung, 2013; Stahl & 
Tung, 2015) may be particularly important in the context of MPJVs. Further, our results may indicate that 
rather than the absolute levels of cognitive-cultural and normative disparity among the partner firms in an 
MPIJV, it may be the compatibility of partner firms’ cognitive-cultural and normative backgrounds that 
matters (e.g., Sarkar, Raj, Cavusgil, & Preet, 2001). In other words, small absolute disparity between 
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partners may have significant effects if there is incompatibility between the respective backgrounds, 
whereas large levels of absolute disparity may have little effect if there is compatibility of cultural values 
and normative imprinting of the partner firms. 
In contrast to our expectation of a U-curve shaped relationship between regulative disparity 
among partner firms’ background and dissolution, our results indicate an inverted U-curve shaped 
relationship. Our findings show that the risk of dissolution increases with growing regulative disparity, 
but that this effect becomes weaker and eventually negative at higher levels of regulative disparity. This 
finding might be explained by the fact that from low to moderate levels of regulative disparity partners’ 
regulative background and their associated imprinting is similar (e.g., their approach to dealing with 
requests for bribes or to prevent the infringements of their property rights). Thus, the combination of 
partners’ abilities to deal with comparatively similar regulative environments may not be particularly 
beneficial from an RBV perspective. At the same time, partner firms’ experience with similar regulative 
environments may increase their desire to contribute to managing the MPIJV’s interaction with its 
regulative environment leading to conflicts among partners and additional coordination costs in line with 
the TCE perspective. At a higher level of regulative disparity, the differences among the regulative 
environments of partner firms’ home countries may be too far apart to allow for much discussion and one 
(e.g., the local partner) will use its ability to deal with regulative environment in the host country avoiding 
conflicts and coordination costs. This explanation is in line with the empirical findings of a study by Xu, 
Pan and Beamish (2004) in which they found that, when faced with high regulative distance, Japanese 
overseas investors use fewer expatriate managers and take lower equity stakes, indicating a comparatively 
greater role given to local partners and their managers. 
A final explanation for the lack of empirical support for the expected effect of disparity on the 
dissolution may lie in the existence of contingencies. It may be that factors, such as the host country 
environment, will affect the existence and shape of the relationship between disparity and IJV 
dissolution
3
. We thus tested a potential moderating effect of the uncertainty of an MPIJV’s environment, 
based on the assumption that greater levels of disparity and the associated greater level of information 
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processing ability of an MPIJV may be particularly useful in highly uncertain environments. The results 
of this additional post hoc analysis indicates that uncertainty—while having a direct negative effect on 
MPIJV dissolution (as discussed below)—does not moderate the effect that disparity has on MPIJV 
dissolution. We suggest that future research further explores the effects of different dimensions of 
disparity among partner firms’ national backgrounds on the dissolution of MPIJVs, by reconceptualizing 
disparity and/or accounting for additional factors that may moderate the effects of disparity on MPIJV 
dissolution. 
Our results with regard to the control variables are broadly in line with the expectations presented 
in previous research. The effect of environmental uncertainty on MPIJV dissolution indicates that 
MPIJVs are more likely to dissolve in uncertain environments, a finding in line with prior research 
(Blodgett, 1992). The negative role of host country experience for the dissolution of MPIJVs is consistent 
with existing research that has argued that such experience allows firms to learn how to cooperate with 
local firms and is thus conducive to the survival of IJVs (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997). The positive 
effect of an equal equity distribution on the dissolution of MPIJVs is in line with prior research on dyadic 
IJVs highlighting the increased management conflicts often associated with equal equity distribution (e.g., 
Killing, 1983). 
Similar to the findings of previous research (e.g., Park & Russo, 1996), we find that MPIJVs set 
up by firms operating in the same industry are more likely to dissolve. The results for our industry 
dummies indicate that MPIJVs in the services and manufacturing sector are more likely to dissolve than 
MPIJVs in the primary sector that we used as the baseline sector. Our results are consistent with prior 
findings that dissolution rates of IJVs vary across industries (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Steensma & 
Lyles, 2000). This may be because MPIJVs in primary sectors are established mainly by foreign firms 
seeking access to natural resources that are controlled by one or more local partners. Given that the access 
of foreign firms to many natural resources in emerging economies, such as the PRC, remains restricted 
(Luo, 1998) alternative ways of accessing those resources are likely to be limited and the likelihood of 
MPIJV dissolution in these sectors is thus likely to be lower than elsewhere. 
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Our study contributes to the literature on international joint ventures in general and to the nascent 
literature on MPIJVs in particular. First, our study extends research on IJVs by enhancing our 
understanding of the factors that affect the dissolution of MPIJVs that are a largely neglected type of joint 
venture. Our findings complement existing research on the IJV dissolution by introducing Stirling’s 
(2007) concept of diversity as a multifaceted construct into the IJV literature. By applying this concept of 
diversity to the context of MPIJVs, we can theorize about the effects of different facets of diversity (i.e., 
variety, balance, disparity) on MPIJV dissolution. This provides a more nuanced analysis of the effects of 
diversity on the survival of such ventures. With regard to variety, which has so far mainly been analyzed 
in the context of alliance portfolios (Cui & O'Connor, 2012), but not in the context of MPIJVs, we find 
evidence for the effect of variety of partner firms’ national backgrounds on MPIJV dissolution. By 
introducing the concept of balance to the analysis of MPIJVs and discussing the potential negative effects 
associated with unbalanced MPIJVs, we enhance our understanding of the factors that determine IJV 
dissolution. Similarly, using the concept of disparity as reflecting the degree to which partner firms’ 
national backgrounds differ along various dimensions allows us to extend the commonly investigated 
dyadic differences to the multiparty case. Overall, we suggest that Stirling’s (2007) framework of 
diversity may serve as one of the analytical frameworks called for by Peng and Shenkar (2002) to 
improve our understanding of complex alliances, such as, the MPIJVs investigated in our study.  
Second, our investigation of diversity in MPIJVs allows us to extend and clarify previous 
findings on MPIJVs and help provide a more complex answer to Gong et al.’s (2007) question as to 
whether multiple partners help or hinder joint venture performance. While some studies have argued for a 
negative impact (Garcia-Canal, et al., 2003; Gong, et al., 2007; Hennart & Zeng, 2002) and others have 
argued for a positive impact (Beamish & Kachra, 2004), empirical evidence on this question remains 
inconclusive (Beamish & Kachra, 2004; Hennart & Zeng, 2002; Park & Russo, 1996). By combining of 
RBV and TCE arguments to investigate the effects of qualitative differences between MPIJVs, we 
reconcile these conflicting findings on the nature of the association between the number of partners and 
IJV outcomes. 
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Although some studies have stressed the importance of accounting for the qualitative differences 
among partners when investigating the effects of an increase in the number of partners (Beamish & 
Kachra, 2004; Garcia-Canal, et al., 2003) our study extends their analyses. It does so by focusing on 
diversity as a qualitative characteristic of MPIJVs and theorizing about the effects that the different facets 
of this diversity have on the dissolution of such ventures. Our findings thus imply that specifically 
accounting for diversity that sets MPIJVs apart from dyadic joint ventures is necessary when studying the 
effects of an increase in the number of IJV partners. This is because an increase in the number of partners 
is not in itself detrimental/conducive to IJV performance but can have positive or negative effects 
depending on the changes in the variety, balance, and disparity among partner firms’ national 
backgrounds associated with an increase in the number of partners.  
Third, our study contributes to the development of TCE and RBV by clarifying their boundaries 
in the context of IJVs. While prior research has shown that transaction costs in joint ventures are 
associated with the number of partners (Gong, et al., 2007), transaction cost theory does not explain how 
the key facets of diversity among transacting partners’ national backgrounds affect these costs. By 
showing that increasing variety in national backgrounds of MPIJV partners as well as increasing 
differences among these national backgrounds affect transaction costs, our study contributes to the 
transaction cost theory of joint ventures. We also find that increasing diversity in MPIJVs may affect the 
transaction costs in MPIJVs through the possible creation of sub-groups. With regard to the RBV 
perspective, which has been used to emphasize the positive effects of partner diversity in alliances based 
on the combination of non-redundant partner resources (Beamish & Kachra, 2004; Goerzen, 2007; 
Goerzen & Beamish, 2005), our study highlights the boundaries of this logic by showing how such 
positive effects might be offset by the rising costs of coordinating and managing increasingly diverse 
alliance partners. 
There are a number of limitations to our study. First, we chose to collect our sample from firms 
operating in the PRC as an appropriate research context, given the important role that IJVs play for the 
activities of foreign activities in the PRC as well as the frequent occurrence of MPIJVs in that context. 
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However, with the exception of the uncertainty of the environment there were no specific indications that 
the host country environment may affect the issues addressed in this study. Further, owing to the 
particular research context, all MPIJVs in our sample involved at least one Chinese firm, which may 
affect the generalizability of our findings if one assumes that MPIJVs with Chinese involvement are 
inherently more/less likely to survive than MPIJVs without Chinese participation. We have no data to test 
this proposition and this would be an area worthy of future research. We therefore believe that our 
arguments and findings are generalizable beyond the specific case of MPIJVs in the People’s Republic of 
China. Nevertheless, we encourage future research to replicate our study by investigating MPIJVs without 
Chinese participation and/or MPIJVs located in other developing or developed economies. 
Finally, we used secondary data on MPIJVs in order to avoid biases associated with questionnaire 
surveys, including survival and common method bias. Consequently, our model did not include 
characteristics of MPIJVs that require the collection of primary data. For instance, primary data would 
have allowed us to capture individual partner firms’ prior experience of collaborating with firms from the 
same backgrounds as those presented in a focal MPIJV. Given the role of the difficulties associated with 
dealing with the variety and disparity of national backgrounds, such country-specific experience may 
potentially play an important moderating role.
4
 Future research using primary data would potentially 
allow for more in-depth analyses of these issues. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Our study provides managerial implications and our findings offer some practical guidance for 
firms considering establishing or entering an existing multiparty alliance. The factors identified in our 
analysis can be used to assess the viability of proposed multiparty organizations in general, and MPIJVs 
in particular, complementing existing findings on partner selection criteria for IJVs. Specifically, the 
importance of variety of national backgrounds present in an MPIJV and the balance across these national 
backgrounds are a new addition to the range of partner selection criteria offered in prior research on 
partner selection in (dyadic) IJVs (e.g., Roy & Oliver, 2009). 
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Our findings are useful also when considering the effects of firms entering or leaving a multi-
party organization. These changes may lead to shifts in the variety, balance, and nature of existing 
differences among the partners, which our findings show to affect the risk of dissolution. For example, the 
exit of a partner from an MPIJV may lead to the creation of sub-groups within the MPIJV by changing 
the balance of national backgrounds represented in the venture.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
1
 Results are available from the authors. 
2
 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting the role of shared language in 
MPIJVs. 
3
 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for stressing the importance of accounting for 
the potential effect of the host country environment. 
4
 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting the potential role of partner 
firms’ country-specific prior experience. 
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Table 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
  No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max. 
1 Termination 248 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 
2 Variety 248 2.31 0.54 2.00 4.00 4.00 
3 Variety SQ 248 5.63 2.93 4.00 16.00 16.00 
4 Balance 248 0.90 0.09 0.33 1.00 1.00 
5 Cog. dist. 248 2.58 1.23 0.19 10.97 10.97 
6 Cog. dist. SQ 248 8.15 9.91 0.04 120.25 120.25 
7 Norm. dist. 248 1.04 0.25 0.01 2.11 2.11 
8 Norm. dist. SQ 248 1.15 0.55 0.00 4.43 4.43 
9 Reg. dist. 248 1.55 0.60 0.40 5.20 5.20 
10 Reg. dist. SQ 248 2.77 2.73 0.16 27.04 27.04 
11 Uncertainty 248 7.00 1.05 4.15 8.41 8.41 
12 Experience 248 18.93 23.50 1.00 135.00 135.00 
13 Equity distr. 248 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 
14 Gov’t part. 248 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
15 Post2001 248 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00 
16 Intra-IJV 248 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Termination 1               
2 Variety -0.14* 1 
             
3 Variety SQ -0.12* 0.99** 1 
            
4 Balance -0.05 0.16 0.14 1 
           
5 Cog. dist. -0.05 0.46** 0.47** -0.09 1 
          
6 Cog. dist. SQ -0.00 0.44** 0.46** -0.18 0.92** 1 
         
7 Norm. dist. -0.05 0.27** 0.27** 0.12 0.48** 0.42** 1 
        
8 Norm. dist. SQ -0.00 0.27** 0.28** 0.10 0.53** 0.48** 0.96** 1 
       
9 Reg. dist. -0.01 0.66** 0.67** 0.09 0.49** 0.49** 0.55** 0.60** 1 
      
10 Reg. dist. SQ 0.01 0.60** 0.62** 0.03 0.46** 0.50** 0.49** 0.55** 0.96** 1 
     
11 Uncertainty 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.14 -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 -0.14 0.00 -0.03 1 
    
12 Experience 0.12 -0.13* -0.12* -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 0.09 0.06 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 1 
   
13 Equity distr. -0.18** 0.14* 0.12* 0.06* 0.27* 0.24* 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.12 -0.07 -0.18** 1 
  
14 Gov’t part. -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.20** 0.19* 0.12* 0.17** 0.14* 0.15 -0.08 -0.06 0.06 1 
 
15 Post2001 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.19** 1 
16 Intra-IJV -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 -0.18** -0.17 -0.18** -0.21** -0.20** -0.19 0.06 0.07 0.11 -0.67** 0.17** 
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; n = 248 
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Table 3 
Cox Regression Results 
 
 (1) 
Cox Proportional 
Hazard Model 
(2) 
Stratified Cox 
Proportional 
Hazard Model 
(3) 
Exponential 
Regression Model 
(4) 
Weibull 
Regression Model 
     
Variety  -2.031* -1.765* -1.948* -2.149* 
 [1.063] [1.196] [1.502] [1.130] 
Variety SQ. 0.496*** 0.448*** 0.473** 0.520*** 
 [0.138] [0.160] [0.205] [0.144] 
     
Balance -1.692*** -1.869*** -1.555*** -1.645*** 
 [0.563] [0.606] [0.543] [0.592] 
     
Disparity     
Cognitive-cultural Differences -0.191 -0.176 -0.144 -0.177 
 [0.160] [0.156] [0.142] [0.178] 
Cognitive-cultural Differences SQ 0.0245 0.0181 0.0202 0.0237 
 [0.0397] [0.0335] [0.0351] [0.0408] 
Normative Differences -0.0128 -0.400 0.116 -0.0346 
 [1.856] [1.731] [1.522] [1.643] 
Normative Differences SQ -0.487 -0.301 -0.543 -0.493 
 [1.143] [1.069] [1.023] [1.098] 
Regulative Differences 2.061*** 1.938*** 1.987*** 2.124*** 
 [0.463] [0.392] [0.746] [0.446] 
Regulative Differences SQ -0.411** -0.374** -0.389*** -0.423** 
 [0.183] [0.148] [0.0896] [0.185] 
     
Uncertainty -0.325* -0.312* -0.298 -0.325 
 [0.193] [0.175] [0.195] [0.208] 
Experience -0.0139*** -0.0148*** -0.0136*** -0.0140*** 
 [0.00535] [0.00428] [0.00462] [0.00474] 
Equity Distribution 0.665*** 0.688*** 0.652*** 0.657*** 
 [0.243] [0.212] [0.238] [0.246] 
Government Participation 0.760 0.788 0.764 0.800 
 [0.565] [0.546] [0.559] [0.612] 
Post2001 0.600 0.556 0.489 0.706 
 [1.321] [1.228] [1.389] [1.461] 
Intra-IJV 1.088** 1.169*** 1.046*** 1.113*** 
 [0.423] [0.445] [0.384] [0.423] 
Service Sector 2.467**  2.381*** 2.503** 
 [1.012]  [0.911] [1.037] 
Manufacturing 1.943*  1.850* 1.949* 
 [1.079]  [0.966] [1.078] 
     
     
Log likelihood -171.09 -146.22 -120.63 -119.78 
LR Chi-square 31.13** 28.36** 30.56** 32.14** 
Harrell’s C 0.7409 0.7251   
Schoenfeld residuals 0.0023*** 0.2340   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; n = 248 
